proposed to make use of prime order subgroups of Z n where n is the product of two large distinct primes. In this paper we analyze a number of such schemes. While these schemes were proposed to utilize the di culty of factoring large integers or that of nding related hidden information (e.g., the order of the group Z n ), our analyzes reveal much easier problems as their real security bases. We itemize three classes of security failures and formulate a simple algorithm for factoring n with a disclosed non-trivial factor of (n) where the disclosure is for making use of a prime order subgroup in Z n . The time complexity of our algorithm is O(n 1=4 =f) where f is a disclosed subgroup order. To factor such n of length up to 800 bits with the subgroup having a secure size against computing discrete logarithm, the new algorithm will have a feasible running time on use of a trivial size of storage.
Introduction
Let n = pq where p and q are large primes. The multiplicative group of integers modulo n, which we denote Z n , has a secret order (the number of elements in the group) (p?1)(q?1). It is assumed to be di cult to discover this quantity from n, and the di culty has been used as the security basis for many cryptosystems and protocols including RSA 16] , , Rabin 15 ], , and many many more.
In the literature we also often see cryptosystems and cryptographic protocols (crypto schemes) that make use of prime order subgroups of Z n (e.g., 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 13] ). In the sequel, whenever we say subgroup, we refer to a prime order subgroup of Z n . The order of such a subgroup is a prime number. The schemes referred above involve various ways of using such subgroups. In some use (a cryptosystem 2]), subgroup elements are disclosed while their order is hidden, and the security basis is an assumed di culty to nd the order of a given element. In another use ( 1, 8, 9, 11, 13] ), a subgroup is made public by disclosing both the order and the elements. This use allows zero-knowledge proof of some properties (such as possession or equality) of the discrete logarithms of the group elements.
We will analyze each of the crypto schemes referred in the above paragraph and itemize three classes of security failures from our analysis. Class 1: given elements of a prime order subgroup, the group order, even as a secret, cannot be used as an RSA-like hidden trapdoor. Class 2: A disclosed prime order subgroup allows to solve problems which should be di cult in Z n had the subgroup not been disclosed. Class 3: the size of a disclosed subgroup versus that of Z n leads to a signi cant reduction on the complexity for factoring n. We will formulate a simple algorithm for factoring n with a special structure designed for making use of prime order subgroups in Z n . To factor such n of length up to 800 bits, our algorithm will have a feasible running time on use of a trivial size of storage.
Throughout the paper we stipulate n = pq for p and q being distinct large primes. For an element a 2 Z n , we will use ord n (a) to denote the order of a modulo n, which is the least positive integer b satisfying a b 1 (mod n):
We also con ne ourselves to study subgroups of odd prime orders; namely, we exclude the case of order 2. Such subgroups merely contain elements which can be used to factor n (if they are not trivial numbers n ? 1 or 1). 
for some (even) numbers k and`. A basic fact in number theory states the following: for every x 2 Z n , m j n implies ord m (x) j ord n (x):
Since ord n (g) is prime, from (2) we know either ord p (g) = ord n (g), or ord p (g) = 1. Same true for ord q (g). Obviously we do not consider the case ord n (g) = 1.
Thus (1) consists of one of the following three cases:
or p = ord n (g)k + 1; q =`+ 1; with ord n (g) 6 j`; (4) or p = k + 1; q = ord n (g)`+ 1; with ord n (g) 6 j k: (5) Note that the case (4) implies g 1 (mod q), or q j g ? 1. Noting further 0 < g ? 1 < n, we will have (let gcd(x; y) denote the greatest common divisor of x and y) gcd(g ? 1; n) = q:
Similarly for the case (5), we will have gcd(g ? 1; n) = p:
We conclude to this end the following statement. Proposition 1. Let g 2 Z n be a non secret element and ord n (g) be an odd prime. Then n = pq must only use p and q with the structures shown in (3), or else the factorization of n will be disclosed. u t A previous cryptosystem 2] contained the above failure for using moduli with the construction (4). The failure was later discovered by Henk Meijer 3], with a suggestion for xing by using moduli with the construction (3). Below we will examine that construction as per the system of 2], and in Section 4 we will further examine the same construction for a di erent danger.
The Case
Further examining (3) we can see n = pq = ord n (g)(ord n (g)k`+ k +`) + 1:
So n ? 1 is a multiple of ord n (g). The number n ? 1 is publicly available even ord n (g) is kept as a secret. This fact tells us that the subgroup generated from g does not have an RSA-like trapdoor. By an RSA-like trapdoor of a group, we mean a secret number which is the inverse of a public exponent modulo the group order. The trapdoor is hidden because the group order is. Now in the case n ? 1 being a multiple of the group order, for any public exponent e, one can compute d to satisfy ed = 1 (mod n ? 1): (6) The existence of d is not a problem. If gcd(e; n?1) > 1, we can replace n?1 in (6) with n?1 gcd(e;n?1) which should still be a multiple of ord n (g) unless gcd(e; n ?1) = ord n (g) which is the case mostly welcome because we have discovered the hidden order.
Since ord n (g) j n ? 1, (6) implies ed = 1 (mod ord n (g)). Thus, in any subgroup of order ord n (g), RSA-like encryption or signature algorithms will no longer be secure. Any variations relying on the secrecy of ord n (g) will fail too.
Below we review a cryptosystem that fails in this way.
Scheme Failure
The scheme 2, 3] consists of a public-key encryption algorithm and digital signature algorithm. Both work in a prime order subgroup of Z n . The order of the subgroup is r = ord n (g), a prime of size 160 bits which is kept secret by the owner of n.
In the encryption algorithm, the public key is (g; n), and the private key is a number z computed as follows z = ? 1 2 mod r: To encrypt a message 0 < m < n, the sender picks a random number t of size less than 160 bits, and compute the ciphertext pair (u; v) as follows u := g 2t mod n;
v := mg t mod n: The recipient decrypts the pair (u; v) by the following calculation.
m := u z v mod n:
The number n ? 1 will su ce for a non-recipient to compute u z and thereby decrypt (u; v). Let s := n ? 1 2 t ; for some t such that s is odd. A non-recipient can compute z 0 = ? 1 2 mod s: Noting that s is a multiple of r and the latter is the order of u, it is easy to see u z 0 = u z mod n:
This means decryption can be performed by anybody. A similar failure in the digital signature algorithm of this cryptosystem can be demonstrated analogously, using n ? 1 as the trapdoor needed. The failure allows anybody to issue signatures for the owner of the public key (g; n).
Class 2: Di cult Problem Made Easy Due to Disclosure of a Subgroup
Given elements in a group, zero-knowledge proofs showing some properties regarding their discrete logarithms require to make the group order public (at least to the parties involved in the zero-knowledge protocols). But when the group in question is Z n , the order (p ? 1)(q ? 1) cannot be disclosed or else no use of the integer factorization problem can be made. A clever idea to solve this contradiction is to de ne zero-knowledge protocols working in a prime order subgroup of Z n , with the order disclosed without leading to discovery of (p ? 1)(q ? 1).
A widely adopted method 1, 8, 9, 11, 13]) to achieve this is to construct p and q with the structures given in (3), and make g and ord n (g) public. Here g is chosen such that ord n (g) = ord p (g) = ord q (g).
A scheme failure demonstrated here is a result of transforming a problem which is known to be di cult in Z n , into an easy one in a prime order subgroup.
This is a group signature scheme 13]. (In order to avoid confusion between a mathematical group and a group of people, in the sequel we use the bold font to refer to the latter.) A group signature scheme allows an individual member in a group (e.g., a corporation environment) to issue a signature on behalf of the group with the signer's identity hidden from the signature veri er (who veri es a signature using the public key of the group). Such signature algorithms are probabilistic ones in that, it should be computationally infeasible to decide if two signatures have been issued by the same group member. To prevent anonymity misuse, a group manager, upon inputting an administration secret and a signature, can deterministically identify the signer who has issued the signature. This is usually achieved by encrypting the signer's identity under the public key of the group manager in the time of signature issuance; the manager need not stay on line.
In this scheme the group manager's public-key cryptosystem is the ElGamal manager's public key is y computed as follows y := g x mod n; where x < q is the private key of the manager (the above-mentioned administration secret). It is assumed that n and g are generated by a trusted center, and nobody else, even not the group manager or members, will know the factorization of n. The center also generates an RSA public exponent e, again with nobody else knowing the inverse of e modulo (p ? 1)(q ? 1).
Let the group have k members. Each member i (1 i k) chooses a secret s i 2 Z n and generates an identity by encrypting the secret s i in RSA encryption id i := s e i mod n:
From the assumption in key generation, we know that even the manager cannot learn s i , the secrets of the members. So (s)he cannot frame any member (provided each member (i) make sure not to choose s i of order q, and this is easy to check against by checking s q i 6 = 1 mod n). These k identities id j (1 j k) are announced to the public, together with g; e; n. So the public key of the group is the following tuple (id 1 ; id 2 ; ; id k ; g; e; n):
Omitting details, when the member i issuing a signature, (s)he shall use the identities of all members in the group and create k pairs of ElGamal-like ciphertext blocks (A j ; B j ) = (g wj mod n; ( id i id j ) dj y wje mod n); 1 j k;
where d j are part of the signature value, and w j are random numbers chosen by the signer i (for j = 1; 2; ; k). The scheme also requires the signer to prove, in zero-knowledge, possession of the eth root of one of the k identities. It is thus obvious that only a group member is able to have generated the above ciphertext pairs, and hence to have issued a signature.
At rst glance, a veri er, apart from knowing the fact that each pair (A j ; B j ) is generated via using the identity id j (for 1 j k), cannot identify the signer i from these pairs. On the other hand, the group manager can identify the signer because each pair (A e j ; B j ) (1 j k) provides ElGamal encryption of ( idi idj ) dj under the manager's public key y, and the member i is identi ed because decrypting (A e i ; B i ) will return 1.
However we notice that 1 is an element in any subgroup of Z n , in particular in all subgroups of order q. Thus, ord n (B i ) = ord n (y wje ) = q; while ord n (B j ) = ord n (( id i id j ) dj y wje ) 6 = q; for j 6 = i:
These facts can easily be learned by anybody via checking whether B q j mod n is 1, for 1 j k. There is no need for an outsider to nd the e-th root in Z n which is well known to be a di cult problem.
A similar failure occurred in a protocol for fair-exchange of signed documents 1] (discovered by Colin Boyd 4] ) which allows decryption by any non-recipient using the order of a subgroup disclosed.
The moral of this failure is that when a prime order subgroup of Z n is made public, great care must be taken in protocol design not to transform a problem in Z n , which is thought to be di cult, into an easy job in the subgroup.
Class 3: Signi cant Complexity Reduction for Integer Factorization
Let us now examine the structure of a composite integer n = pq in which a factor of (n) = (p ? 1)(q ? 1) is made public. The widely adopted method for disclosing a subgroup of Z n 1, 8, 9, 11, 13] ) is in such a structure. Let n = pq; p = 2p 0 f + 1; q = 2q 0 f + 1; (7) where p; q; f are distinct primes and p 0 ; q 0 are relatively prime integers. Here we see that the quantity r = 4f 2 (8) is a factor of (n), and in the schemes referred above, the factor r is made public. (In 11] , an additional factor, which is a factor of p 0 , is also made public. We will examine that case in a moment.) We rst note n + 1 = (n) + p + q: (9) So when rj (n) is disclosed, we have p + q n + 1(mod r): (10) For r < p+q (otherwise the above congruence is an equation and p+q is disclosed directly), we can rewrite the congruence (10) as p + q = kr + (n + 1 mod r); (11) where k is a unknown quantity to be determined. From (11) it is easy to see jkj jp + qj ? jrj, where jaj denotes the bit length of the integer a in the binary representation. Notice that if p + q becomes known, factoring n follows a simple calculation. For known r, nding p + q using (11) is equivalent to nding the unknown k, and hence the di culty of factoring n is equivalent to that of nding k. Clearly, an exhaustive search for p + q based on the equation (11) 
steps. This seems to be the basis for the choice of security parameters in most schemes using a prime order subgroup of Z n 8, 9, 11, 13]. However, there exists a much more e cient attack only requiring the square root of the above complexity. Combining (9) and (11), we have n + 1 ? (n + 1 mod r) = (n) + kr: (13) Since u (n) = 1 (mod n) for an arbitrary u in Z n , raising u to the both sides of (13) yields u n+1?(n+1 mod r) = w k (mod n); (14) where w = u r mod n is known. Here we may assume u to have the maximum order (n) = 2fp 0 q 0 since most elements in Z n will have this order. Note by symmetry for p > q (hence p 0 > q 0 ) and q 0 > 3, we have ord n (u) = 2fp 0 q 0 > 2fp 0 3 = 3(p ? 1) > 2p > p + q > kr:
So the order of u (greatly) exceeds kr and this means in the transformation from (9), (11) to (14), the quantity k will not be reduced in modulo ord n (u).
A straightforward way to solve the equation (14) is to use Shanks' \baby-step giant-step" method (e.g., see 18, 5] ). It requires O(2 jkj=2 ) = O(2 (jp+qj?jrj)=2 ) (15) steps of group computation (multiplication modulo n) and the same order of memory. This is a much lowered time complexity than that in (12) as it is the positive square root of (12) . 1 However, since space is usually more expensive than time, the large space needed makes this method likely to be infeasible for k with critical sizes. Fortunately there are two memoryless variants of Shanks' method due to Pollard: the rho method and the lambda method 14] (see also 18]). Both methods have the same square-root running time, but the space requirement is negligible. Pollard's rho method requires explicit knowledge of the order of the underlying group (i.e., the order of w in (14)), so it can't be used for our purpose.
However, the lambda method works even if the group order is not known; The method may produce an exponent with a small multiple of the group order added (modulo addition/subtraction). This is usually not a problem. In particular, for k with sizes of our interest, the order of w (ord n (w) = p 0 q 0 ) should be much larger than k. So we can extract the exact value of k from the lambda method.
In the above we have proven the following statement: Proposition 2. Let n = pq for p, q being two distinct primes and suppose that jpj jqj. When r is a known factor of (p ? 1)(q ? 1), then n can be factored in time O(2 (jnj?2jrj)=4 ) using Pollard's lambda method. u t Most schemes using the key setting in (7) base their security on both the di culty of factoring n and the di culty of nding discrete logarithms mod f for the known order f. Let us consider minimal requirements for choosing key parameters for such applications. For this, suppose that the current (perhaps not long-term) accepted comfortable margin for computational infeasibility is about 2 70 . First of all, the disclosed order f should be at least 140 bits long to thwart Pollard's rho method for nding discrete logarithms mod f. Next, Proposition 2 requires that jnj ? 2jrj should be at least 280. Therefore, the modulus n should be at least 844 bits long (i.e., jpj = jqj = 422), since jrj = 2jfj + 2 = 282. More generally, to guarantee the security level of 2 jfj=2 steps for both the above two attacks, we should have at least jpj = jqj 3jfj:
Note however that though Proposition 2 is the best result currently known (at least to the authors) on exploitation of computing small discrete logarithms, we can't exclude the possibility of existing a more e cient specialized factoring attack for such a key setting. 1 A similar (less general) method for the square-root reduction was rst given in 12]. From the above analysis we know that 840 should be the least length setting for a modulus n in the construction (7) of which a subgroup of order f is disclosed. Any such moduli with length less than 800 bits are likely to be dangerous. For instance, for an 800-bit n = pq with p, q of similar lengths and for f being a 160-bit prime, n can be factored in roughly 2 40 where poly 1 (k), poly 2 (k) are polynomials in k = jp 0 j = jq 0 j (this de nition of k is speci ed in Section 2 of 19]). In 11], no information is given on the sizes of p and q with respect to the size of d . However, from the speci ed order of magnitude, the size of d is comparable to jp 0 j; jq 0 j and it may easily reach a few hundred bits. Note that in such a setting, 4f 2 d is a known factor of (p ? 1)(q ? 1). So using this factor in the complexity bound in Proposition 2, the time for factoring n can further be lowered by 2 j d j=2 times from the case where only f is disclosed.
The only way to avoid factorization is to increase the size of the modulus (and must at the same time limit the degree of poly 2 (k) in comparison to that of poly 1 (k)). Such moduli are likely to exceed a practical size.
We have implemented Pollard's lambda method for solving the equation (14) to verify that our attack actually works. A number of moduli with the structure of (7) have been tested and successfully factored. As nontrivial examples (listed in A), each modulus n has 704 bits and (n) has a factor r = 4f 2 with f being prime. We computed the exponent k in (14) using our implementation of the lambda method and knowledge of n and f only. Table 1 lists the result of factoring four 704-bit moduli n with jfj = 160; 156; 152 and 148, corresponding to jkj = 31; 39; 47 and 55, respectively, on a Pentium II PC (Windows 95, 266 MHz). 2 We used the crypto-library with partial assembly coding (developed in Future Systems, Inc.), but the lambda algorithm itself was not much optimized.
Note 
Conclusion
We have analyzed a number of failures in cryptosystems and protocols that use prime order subgroups of Z n , and shown that great care must be taken for such uses. The results of the open trapdoor revealed in Section 2, and the much lowered complexity for factoring n shown in Section 4, may not be new in mathematics; nevertheless to our belief, should be aware to the community of cryptosystem and protocol design.
